Problém statusu přírodních zákonů v Popperově rané teorii poznání

Jitka Paitlová

Abstract


This paper focuses on the problem of status of natural laws and is based upon the analysis of Popper’s early work Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislehre that had been written before his Logic of Scientific Discovery but was published almost fifty years later. Popper and logical positivists agree that from logical point of view it is possible to decide about the truth of singular reality statements but never of those general. Therefore, the positivists refuse to acknowledge natural laws as general statements and they call them just as summary reports which can be definitively verified or falsified. On the contrary Popper asserts that natural laws are general statements which are definitively (logical) falsifiable, while in a positive way they can be only temporary (pragmatic) corroborate. Popper is inspired by so called consequent pragmatism and he calls his own solution of the problem of the status of natural laws as the asymmetry of values.

Keywords


Popper; Grundprobleme; theory of knowledge; natural laws; Schlick; positivism

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Published by the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic.
ISSN: 1212-9097