Anthropomorphism as a methodological problem of animal ethics (in the memory of Sir Patrick Bateson)
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Year of publication | 2017 |
| Type | Article in Periodical |
| Magazine / Source | Ethics and Bioethics (in Central Europe) |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ebce-2017-0016 |
| Field | Philosophy and religion |
| Keywords | bioethics; anthropomorphism; animal behaviour; pain; evolution |
| Description | The paper aims to highlight the serious methodological issue of contemporary zoological research and its bioethical implications (especially topics on the subject of animal ethics). In the discourse on the issue of the pain and suffering of animals and in derived questions, a certain form of anthropomorphism and reductionism is manifested. Ethical applications of empirical research results that are relevant to humans (or humans as an anatomically and physiologically analogous animal species - mammals) are preferred. Subsequently, these extrapolations serve as a criterion for judging the qualitative level of the capabilities of all animals (e.g. cephalopods, insects etc.). Serious ethical conclusions are drawn from this reduction. |