What is „metaphysical“ social constructionism?
| Authors | |
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| Year of publication | 2026 |
| Type | Appeared in Conference without Proceedings |
| Citation | |
| Description | A number of social constructionists have developed what they describe as metaphysical constructionist theories of social kinds such as race, gender, and disability. Some of these authors reject the charge that they conflate the social construction of reality (i.e., objects and kinds) with the social construction of our knowledge of reality (i.e., ideas, concepts, and theories), the former being widely regarded as untenable. However, the distinction between metaphysical and epistemic social constructionism remains insufficiently clear, as does the question of its theoretical significance. In this paper, I argue that a defensible form of metaphysical social constructionism requires a realist—rather than projectivist or error-theoretic—account of social kinds. I then apply this criterion to a recent constructionist theory—Ásta’s conferralism. I contend that, despite the author’s claims, conferralism is more plausibly interpreted as an epistemic rather than a metaphysical theory. Finally, I argue that the central aim of conferralism—namely, to explain the constraints and enablements associated with an individual’s inclusion in a social kind—can be achieved within an epistemic constructionist framework, according to which social kinds are nothing over and above concepts. |
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