An Outline of the Concept of Adaptive Logics

Vol.17,No.1(2016)

Tomáš Ondráček Jan Štěpánek

https://doi.org/10.5817/pf16-1-1451

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Abstract
The aim of the paper is to introduce the concept of adaptive logics (AL) or rather adaptive logical approach. In the introduction, a motivation and an emergence of AL are briefly discussed. In the second part of the paper, specifics of AL are analysed – especially non-monotonic character, internal and external dynamics, as well as the structure of AL, namely the distinction between upper limit logic and lower limit logic. In this part, the dynamic proof is also described. Applications of AL are presented in the third part. Three illustrations from three different branches of philosophy are presented. First one is an illustration of description of science – a traditional application of AL. Second one is an illustration of solving a deontic conflict – this is a new direction within in AL which has recently been researched. Third one is an illustration of analyses of metaphors – an example of an unusual application of AL. In the conclusion of the paper, contemporary results of AL are critically evaluated with respect to some problems of the project of AL.

Keywords:
logic; adaptive logics; defeasible reasoning; dynamic proof; description of science; deontic con-flicts; metaphor analysis
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