

# Summary

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The present book, *Individuals and Their Properties: Studies in Intensional Metaphysics*, contains selected papers of the present author published in the last seven years. The papers focus on several topics concerning individuals, mainly the theory of bare individuals, and properties, focusing especially on the classifications of properties and their relationship to individuals. The papers provide his own contribution to the fruitful debate held in the Czech and Slovak philosophical regions. A significant feature of this debate is an initial influence by Pavel Tichý's philosophical and logical work. The present author follows Tichý; he defends, modifies, elaborates and also synthesizes his proposals into a compact theory which is built within Tichý's (hyper)intensional logical framework.

The structure of the book and contents of its chapters (based on abstracts) are as follows.

1. *Bare individuals and their properties: an introduction.* The chapter opens with a survey of the international debate on bare particulars-individuals-substrata: proponents, opponents, main theses, and main criticisms. Then, it introduces the Czech-Slovak discussion, reflecting nearly exclusively Pavel Tichý's proposal. The main feature of Tichý's theory of bare individuals is its stress on modality and antiessentialism. The chapter may serve also as a guide to the Tichýan theory of the present author.

## I. Properties

2. *Intensional explication of the notion of property.* This chapter is intended as an extensive defence of the explication of properties as intensions, i.e. certain functions from possible worlds. The material adequacy of this explication is based on incorporation of a large scale of intuitions connected with our intuitive notion of property. An example of such intuition is the conviction concerning the contingent character of instantiation of properties. I also discuss the alleged structuredness of properties, which is revealed to be rather a feature of concepts of properties; concepts are explicable within Tichý's framework as well.

3. *Definitions of basic kinds of properties.* Following Pavel Tichý, who distinguishes trivial (i.e. constant) and non-trivial properties and uses them to claim that individuals have only trivial properties necessarily, Pavel Cmorej extends his classification by distinguishing two kinds of non-trivial properties, namely purely empirical and partly essential properties. Cmorej has shown that any partly essential property is essential for certain individual(s) but not for certain other individual(s). I offer rigorous formal definitions of trivial / non-trivial, essential / non-essential properties, and purely empirical / partly essential / purely essential properties. Then, I add a definition of trivially void properties, which completes the last mentioned division into a quadruple of kinds of properties. However, the use of the concept of accidental properties gives rise to another (but not equivalent) quadruple: purely accidental / partly essential (i.e. partly accidental) / purely essential / void properties. This extensive chapter can be also seen as logic of properties.

## II. Bare individuals

4. *Bare individuals: a reformulation of Tichý's conception.* A bare individual was conceived by Pavel Tichý as such individual, for which it is possible to lack a non-trivial property it actually instantiates (and still remain the same individual) and, at the same time, impossible to lack any of its trivial properties. After a closer examination of such definition(s) I conclude that the specified property “to be a bare individual” cannot be possessed by any individual. This is caused by the existence of partly essential properties defined by Pavel Cmorej. I suggest several alternative definitions of bare individuals which are immune to such criticism.

5. *Bare individuals are not without properties.* Proponents of the theory of bare individuals (such as Tichý) claim an ontological thesis according to which an individual can ontologically lack any property of a certain kind. (Sometimes an epistemological thesis is claimed that properties can be conceptually separated from an individual.) However, opponents of the theory disprove an ontological thesis according to which an individual ontologically lacks (or: can lack) every property of a certain kind. Thus they wrongly attack the theory of nude individuals. The theory of bare individuals is not compatible with the theory of nude individuals. As I argue in details, individuals (of the theory of bare individuals) instantiate a pleiade of properties (including purely contingent ones).

6. *Pure individuators and bare individuals.* In a reaction to the proposal given by Cmorej, I suggest an alternative explanation of Tichý's construal of notions of bare individuals and pure individuators. In my view, a definition of bare individuals is in fact an ontological thesis concerning individuals, whereas a definition of pure individuators is an epistemological thesis concerning individuals. The former one says which kind of properties an individual has or can have, while the latter one says how properties can be conceptually distinguished from individuals (not how to ontologically deprive individuals of properties). Consequently, concepts of bare individuals and pure individuators are two concepts of the same property possessed by all individuals.

7. *Two kinds of bareness and three theses concerning bare individuals.* I show that Martin Schmidt's criticism of my theory is simply a misunderstanding. In the second part of the chapter, I expose another reaction to Schmidt's more careful attack to the theory of bare individuals proposed by me or Tichý. I show mainly that the theory is far from being a substrata theory exposed by Schmidt; I stress also its accent on modality.

### III. Existence and individuals

8. *What is contingent existence of individuals?* As I argue in details, the notion of contingent (nontrivial) existence of individuals is entirely not definable. (Three basic kinds of existence are explained; none of them is contingently applicable to individuals.) The notion is rather confused with one of the two other notions, those of improper kinds of existence. These two kinds of nontrivial existence of individuals are definable, yet are of little serious interest from the philosophical point of view.

9. *Projection and abstract vs. concrete individuals.* Two kinds of individuals are distinguished: abstract and concrete. Whereas abstract individuals belong to our conceptual realm, concrete individuals (particulars) individuate the world of matter. A subject inquiring the external world projects abstract individuals onto the concrete ones (i.e. pieces of matter). Our theory offers a solution to various ontological and epistemological puzzles concerned with individuals, e.g. the Ship of Theseus, the Polish Logician, problems with reidentification, or even some problems with proper names.