Intuitivní teorie : Epistemický status morálních intuic

Title in English The Intuitive Theories : The Epistemic Status of Moral Intuitions


Year of publication 2015
Type Appeared in Conference without Proceedings
MU Faculty or unit

Faculty of Arts

Description In my presentation last year, I was at the same time able (i) to defend the claim that the epistemic status of moral intuitions depends solely on whether our preferred normative theory approve of it or not and (ii) to realize in the Q&A section that it is not possible. The problem lies in the unfortunate fact that normative theories themselves rest on foundation that consists of unjustified beliefs – i.e. on the category that falls into the range of my favored definition of intuition. Therefore, the question arises what is their source of epistemic value when there is no normative theory that could assign it to them yet? The aim of my current presentation is to correct the flaws of the past and to deal with this problem which is crucial for the whole normative project.
Related projects:

You are running an old browser version. We recommend updating your browser to its latest version.