Teorie jednání ve světle experimentální filosofie

Title in English Theory of Action in Light of Experimental Philosophy


Year of publication 2015
MU Faculty or unit

Faculty of Arts

Description One of the problems that troubled philosophers about theory of action was determining whether agent performed the act intentionally. They have established conditions necessary for saying that agent's action was intentional and also they dealt with special cases such as causing a side-effect. Since experimental philosophy was established the attention has been dedicated to users of that term - folks. Do they follow the conditions imposed by philosophers or have their own? Which of the conditions are most crucial to them? What is the folk concept of intentional action like? However, everything is more complicated than it looks like at first sight. It turned out that there is one more factor influencing our deliberation in case of intentionality. And that is how a phenomenon was born, a phenomenon that is keeping busy (not just) experimental philosophers for last 12 years now. I will focus on this phenomenon for most part of my lecture, but I will also answer questions like whether someone else has discovered this phenomenon before, if it is only affects action theory or what are the consequences of all of this.
Related projects:

You are running an old browser version. We recommend updating your browser to its latest version.