Key Aspects of Moral Character in the Situationist Challenge



Year of publication 2018
Type Appeared in Conference without Proceedings
MU Faculty or unit

Faculty of Arts

Description Situationist challenge in moral philosophy refers to the contemporary criticism of Aristotle's concept of moral character. It is based on a different area than the previous criticism, and thus presents a new challenge to the classical theory. Whether or not this critique is successful in challenging the empirical and normative adequacy of the Aristotelian concept, it is linked with an extensive discussion. I considered it important to explore what we can learn about the classical theory in the mirror of contemporary moral psychology. In my lecture, I will introduce those aspects which constitute the Aristotelian concept of moral character as a theory (as I argue) resistant to the situationist criticism. These aspects are of course based on the general features of moral character (they are implied by them), but they specifically were not given the same attention so far. Discussions on situationist challenge show that if Aristotle's concept of moral character is to be defended as an empirically and normatively adequate one, it is necessary to pay sufficient attention to those aspects.
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