The Paradox of Moralistic Fallacy: A Case against the Dangerous Knowledge

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Authors

ONDRÁČEK Tomáš

Year of publication 2018
Type Article in Periodical
Magazine / Source Teorie vědy : věda, technika, společnost
MU Faculty or unit

Faculty of Economics and Administration

Citation
Web odkaz na článek
Keywords moralistic fallacy; reverse naturalistic fallacy; Bernard D. Davis; paradox of moralistic fallacy; dangerous knowledge
Description In this article, the concept of moralistic fallacy introduced by B. D. Davis is elaborated on in more detail. The main features of this fallacy are discussed, and its general form is presented. The moralistic fallacy might have some undesirable outcomes. Some of them might even be in direct conflict to the original moral position. If this occurs, it is possible to characterize it as a paradox of moralistic fallacy. The possibility of this paradox provides a further reason not to prevent any scientific inquiries and not to depict any knowledge as dangerous.
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