Ideas, indexicals, and the private language in Frege's philosophy
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Year of publication | 2024 |
| Type | Article in Periodical |
| Magazine / Source | Studia philosophica |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| web | https://digilib.phil.muni.cz/handle/11222.digilib/digilib.81188 |
| Doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.5817/sPh2024-2-2 |
| Keywords | private language; indexicals; Frege; late Wittgenstein; Sinn; thoughts; ideas |
| Description | The study concerns a possible private language in the philosophy of Gottlob Frege, particularly in his scarce investigation of indexicals such as 'I' and 'now'. The indexicals may be seen as private from the late-Wittgensteinian perspective because their sense (Sinn) cannot be repeated outside of a specific linguistic context of the expression. The study examines whether these indexicals presuppose a private language. If Frege's philosophy contains such privateness (for which only insufficient evidence can be found), it would be peculiar since a major part of his work implies that all thoughts are objective and publicly communicable. However, the privateness in Frege's remarks rather differs from Wittgenstein's, for the indexical's sense should be principally expressible at any time. |
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