Interpretive injustice : The moral dimension of understanding
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Year of publication | 2025 |
| Type | Article in Periodical |
| Magazine / Source | HERMENEIA |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| web | https://hermeneia.ro/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/01_Dominik_2025.pdf |
| Keywords | Hermeneutics; Epistemic injustice; Interpretive injustice; Virtuous hermeneutics; Hermeneutical injustice |
| Description | This article explores the moral dimension of understanding, focusing on the concept of interpretive injustice. Drawing on work on epistemic injustice, it examines how language and interpretive practices reflect and perpetuate dominance and oppression. Two forms of interpretive injustice are defined: ignorance and misinterpretation. Ignorance arises from a lack of engagement with minority hermeneutical resources, while misinterpretation involves the misattribution of meanings by dominant groups. The article argues that interpretive injustice causes both epistemic and moral harm. It also challenges the emphasis on macro-level power dynamics, suggesting that interpretive injustice can also be done to members of dominant groups. Interpretive injustice need not be systematic to constitute a moral wrong. The refined definition of the notion recognises that interpretive injustice occurs when an utterance is interpreted using the hermeneutical resources of a different sociolinguistic group despite relevant differences between these resources. |
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