Pojmové postoje z hlediska logiky
| Title in English | Notional Attitudes from the Viewpoint of Logic |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Year of publication | 2004 |
| Type | Article in Periodical |
| Magazine / Source | SPFFBU |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Field | Philosophy and religion |
| Keywords | notional attitudes; attitude logic; seeking; intensional transitives |
| Description | As Quine already recognized, there are attitudes that cannot be read in 'relational sense (extensionally), but exclusively in 'notional sense' (for example 'John seeks unicorn'). However his clausal analysis does not seem to be fully satisfactory. Notional attitudes should be characterized as empirical relations between an agent (individual) and (mostly) an intension whose concept is 'indispensable', i.e. it cannot be substituted by the non-synonymous concept of another intension (it is the case when values of these intensions are not the same for all possible worlds and time moments). There are also other attitudes that can be characterized as notional too: mathematical/logical attitudes towards hyperintension which is not propositional hyperintension (again, substitution by terms expressing non-equivalent concepts are not allowed). With the use of concepts of Transparent Intensional Logic we explored many typical attitudes of both kinds. |