The Procedural Conception of Language and Fact
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Year of publication | 2007 |
| Type | Article in Proceedings |
| Conference | Problém hraníc medzi filozofiou, umením a vedou |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Field | Philosophy and religion |
| Keywords | fact; state of affairs;possible worlds;intensional logic; transparent instensional logic |
| Description | Within the intensional logic a proposition was defined as a function from possible worlds to truth-values and a possible world is defined as a certain collection of state-of-affairs, (possible) facts and fact as true proposition. However, propositions are not structured, they do not consist of in certain individual instantiating certain property what is a fact in the pre-theoretical sense. Tichý's concept of propositional construction is such a structured item (language was conceived by him as procedural). I argue for the necessity to adopt constructions as explicata for the notion of state-of-affair (fact). |
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