Pojem pravdivosti v lhářských paradoxech: Tichého řešení

Investor logo
Title in English The Concept of Truth in Liar's Paradoxes: Tichý's Solution
Authors

RACLAVSKÝ Jiří

Year of publication 2009
Type Article in Proceedings
Conference Poznanie a prawda
MU Faculty or unit

Faculty of Arts

Citation
Field Philosophy and religion
Keywords Liar paradox; semantic paradoxes; truth; ramified hierarchy of types; Russell; Tarski; Tichý; transparent intensional logic
Description Both first classical resolutions of Liar's paradoxes suffer from several disadvantages. Pavel Tichý's proposal can be characterized as a golden middle way combining Russell and Tarski but avoiding problematic points of their proposals. Any language L is construed as a function from expressions to (logically explicated) meanings. Since no function can be among its own values, 'L' (and expressions containing 'L') is meaningless in L. No sentence is true simpliciter but relatively to what it says in a given language. Then the Liar's sentence (with 'true in L') is clearly meaningless (thus it cannot be true or false).
Related projects:

You are running an old browser version. We recommend updating your browser to its latest version.