Kdyby chyby: epistemologie myšlenkových experimentů
| Title in English | Woulda, coulda, shoulda: epistemology of thought experiments |
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| Authors | |
| Year of publication | 2011 |
| Type | Monograph |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Description | I defend a moderate optimistic position, i.e. the attitude that regards thought experiments as having an epistemic value, under precisely determined conditions. The first chapter of the book is devoted to the clarification of concepts. In the second chapter I deal with the main question of this book: Are thought experiments the source of epistemic justification? I critically present four optimistic responses to the question. In the third chapter I introduce a moderate optimistic attitude which holds that thought experiments are the source of a weak, prima facie justification. I argue that the undefeated results of thought experiments can shift the burden of proof in critical discussion. The fourth chapter deals with the conception that limits the epistemic value of thought experiments to the role of general arguments. Finally, I propose a scheme of argumentation by thought experiment that describes the experimental outcome as an example to be generalized. |
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