Mead and Self-embodiment: Imitation, Simulation and the Problem of Taking the Attitude of the Other
| Autoři | |
|---|---|
| Rok publikování | 2013 |
| Druh | Článek v odborném periodiku |
| Časopis / Zdroj | Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie |
| Fakulta / Pracoviště MU | |
| Citace | |
| Obor | Filosofie a náboženství |
| Klíčová slova | imitation; embodied; simulation; action; understanding; pragmatism |
| Popis | In the first part, the paper analyzes Mead's treatment of embodiment and briefly contrasts it with contemporary theories of "mind-reading" (theory-theory, simulation theory). Next, it focuses on the findings of mirror-neuron research and tries to answer the question of whether mirror neurons provide sufficient mechanisms for imitation, thus, undermining Mead's lifelong conviction that imitation cannot predate taking the attitude/role of the other (a line of criticism recently taken up by Stephen Turner). The author concludes that mirror neurons, by themselves, do not represent a sufficient condition for imitation and further suggests that we ought to understand the functioning of mirror-neuron mechanisms in terms of simulation rather than imitation. Adoption of such a position, as the author argues, reinforces Mead's pragmatist emphasis on the role of embodiment in human social interaction. |
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